In the patient who is suffering, it is more elegant to remove the suffering than to remove the patient
The arguments rage on about euthanasia. Those with religious beliefs say that it is immoral (or maybe that it is against God's law) to take a life, while humanists maintain that autonomy is of prime importance, and if someone wishes to die, they should be granted their wish.
There are two other objections. The first is that, while all are agreed that the problem of the person who is suffering is an important one, it seems fundamentally inelegant to solve it by removing the person rather than by removing the suffering.
The second relates to the fact that the arguments always centre on voluntary euthanasia. Repeated straw polls carried out on audiences at lectures over the years have convinced me that while a proportion of people do indeed fear uncontrolled symptoms (a problem which palliative care continues to make less of an issue), at least as many fear being kept alive beyond their time, for example on ventilators, or becoming demented. As patients in these latter two circumstances are almost always legally incompetent, it would seem that the whole voluntary euthanasia debate is a nonsense.
The ability or right to prescribe morphine and corticosteroids does not constitute 'best supportive care'
Studies of chemotherapy regimes often compare the 'active' treatment against 'best supportive care', but frequently this is defined in the protocol as being allowed to prescribe morphine and steroids. How can anything defined in this way possibly be termed 'best supportive care'? 'Standard supportive care' possibly, 'bargain basement to avoid being struck off the medical register supportive care' probably, but 'best'? How was it allowed to happen?
Perhaps we need a trial in which matched patients are randomized to receive multiprofessional specialist palliative care in one arm, and 'bargain basement to avoid being struck off the medical register supportive care' in the other. That would never receive ethics approval, so perhaps the nearest that we will be able to get is if some brave soul will design a study of patients diagnosed with disseminated malignancy, and compare chemotherapy in one arm with multiprofessional specialist palliative care in the other. Provided that all patients could withdraw from the study and receive the treatment in the other arm, this would at least stand some chance of being ethically acceptable.
Any decision taken with care is the right decision: it remains the right decision, even if subsequent events turn out badly
There is a lot of complicated theory about decisionmaking, much of it irrelevant to our patients and their relatives. Often, when faced with the need to make a decision in a situation where they know that all kinds of things may go wrong, they worry that they may later conclude that they have decided badly. Should she have an operation? Should we take him on holiday? These people need to be reassured. The future is always uncertain, so if care has been taken to weigh all the known factors, the result is the right decision, and remains so forever.
The human body is not at all like a machine: it is more like a weather system, inherently unstable and unpredictable
It is tempting to view the human as an enormously complex mechanism: increasing precision of radiological investigations and detailed sequencing of the Editorial Eight aphorisms for palliative care human genome is leading a segment of both medical and lay opinion towards the view that, if only we could see things in enough detail, all would become predictable.
Out in the real world, it seems increasingly difficult to predict anything more than about half an hour ahead. This fundamental unpredictability is not a feature of machines, even very complex ones. It is far more reminiscent of climatic and other systems which are ruled by chaos theory rather than by mechanics. In chaotic systems, one can only give probabilities that certain events will happen; at an individual level, uncertainties always persist. The best that we can hope for is to become more precise in our ability to state the odds of something happening.
In terminally ill patients, giving any four-fold range of prognosis is more likely to be wrong than right
Although the underlying assumption is not strictly applicable, the mathematics are illuminating. If individual deaths within a population occur at random, exponential mathematics apply. It can then be easily shown that any four-fold range of prognosis is more likely to be wrong than right. Thus, if the half-life of the population is 4 weeks, more individuals (more than a quarter of the total) die in the first 2 weeks than in the second 2 weeks, and exactly a quarter die in the next 4 weeks, so that the total dying in 2-8 weeks is rather less than one half. Similarly, with a range from 1 to 4 weeks, half die later than 4 weeks, and there have been deaths during the first week; with a range of 4-16 weeks, half the deaths occur in the first four weeks and a few more occur later than 16 weeks.
As a general principle, it is impossible to give an accurate prognosis to an individual, because individuals do not behave like populations.
You need to live your life as though two totally opposite things are both true: the first, that you will die tomorrow, and the second, that you will live for another 5 years 'If there is something that is important to do, get on and do it. If in a few months time you are still reasonably fit, you may be able to do it again. But if you wait until you think you really ought to be getting on with it, almost certainly by then you are not well enough.
'On the other hand, you have to stay part of the world; there is no gain in curling up in a corner and just waiting. Plans still have to be made, although it is always sensible to keep them flexible and have a fall back position.'
It is better to die leaving things unsaid, than to live with nothing left to say Some patients, when told that they are dying, immediately go home and 'put their affairs in order' perhaps leaving themselves with no role in their family. Equally, some relatives after bereavement regret the fact that they were unable to say goodbye. But what if they had said goodbye, and then the patient had survived? What would there be left to say?
The concept of duality of an afterlife (heaven and hell) is not a reasonable one I have always felt that the proposition is flawed and internally inconsistent that an eternity in hell might be the fate of anyone who does not believe in an all-powerful and all-loving God. Indeed, one might suggest (as many have done previously) that the existence of two places for the afterlife, or any other finite plural number, is illogical. If two, why not three? The only sensible numbers in this context are zero (that is, there is no afterlife), one (we all go to the same place) and an infinity (we all have our own individual afterlife).
Not having a brain of infinite capacity prevents me from embracing the last of these, and if there is no afterlife, we do not need to write many words on the subject. Is there a single fate which is both heaven and hell? In this model, the essence (spirit or soul, call it what you will) of everyone who had ever lived might be there as entities, bringing us back to the problems of the contemplation of infinity. Alternatively, we could abandon the concept of persistence of the individual, and believe, like the Buddhists, that the soul returns 'like a dewdrop to the shining ocean'.
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